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Abstract— In this paper we assess the hypothesis that a
strategy including information related to game-specific factors
in a poker tournament performs better than one founded on
hand strength knowledge alone. Specifically, we demonstrate
that the use of information pertaining to opponents’ prior
actions, the stage of the tournament, one’s chip stack size and
seating position all contribute towards a statistically significant
improvement in the number of tournaments won.
Additionally, we test the hypothesis that a strategy which
combines information from all the aforementioned factors
performs better than one which employs only a single factor.
We show that an evolutionary algorithm is successfully able to
resolve conflicting signals from the specified factors, and that
the resulting strategies are statistically stronger.
Keywords: evolutionary algorithms, game playing, tour-
nament poker
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers in artificial intelligence have long been inter-
ested in developing programs for games which are able to
compete with and ultimately beat human opposition. Recent
successes in the games of checkers, chess and backgammon
have encouraged efforts on more complex games such as
go, bridge and poker. Card games such as those mentioned
present a particular challenge for researchers due the lack of
complete information of the game state at any point in time.
Opponents’ hands must be modelled probabilistically, with
inferential conclusions reached by computing the likelihood
of each players’ holding given their actions in the current
and previous games. The development of poker players is
especially exacting since the nature of the game demands
that each competitor tries to deceive their opponents as to
which cards they hold. Research into games of imperfect
information such as poker has the potential to be extremely
valuable, since reasoning under conditions of uncertainty is
typical of many real-world problems.
Early game theoretic investigations of poker have been
superseded by significant contemporary contributions. The
GAMES Group at the University of Alberta has led the way
in combining a strong analytical understanding of the game
together with innovative approaches in opponent modelling.
Their work over the last ten years has been so successful
that a particular poker variant - two-player limit ring game
Texas Hold’em - is now practically solved in the game
theoretic sense, with continual improvements in the opponent
modelling leading to increasingly strong players.
However, many hurdles have yet to be cleared before we
reach the point of having a poker World Champion. Three
difficulties in particular have to be overcome to take the
current state of the art to such a level. Firstly, poker is almost
always played between several competing players, rather than
two. This means that multiple opponent models must be
maintained. Secondly, the main event of the World Series
of Poker held annually in Las Vegas uses a form of betting
known as no limit. Where limit betting sets pre-specified
increments to each player’s bet and raise, no limit allows the
competitors to bet any amount up to their current chip stack
size. The third challenge is that the World Championships
play Texas Hold’em in a tournament, rather than ring game
format. A tournament setting adds extra complexity to the
decision-making process compared to the same situation in
a ring game. The nature of tournament play dictates that
each player must balance accumulating and protecting their
chips to ensure survival. This paper marks the first attempt
to understand some of the issues involved in developing a
player for Texas Hold’em played within a tournament, so
that strong ring game programs may be more easily adapted
to the tournament format.
Noted poker authors consistently state in the non-academic
poker literature that factors contained within the tourna-
ment are important and should be included in the decision-
making process before selecting a betting action. Taking
hand strength knowledge as a given, the first hypothesis that
we test in this research is that the inclusion of information
relating to:
• opponents’ prior betting actions
• the stage of the tournament
• one’s own chip stack amount
• seating position
improves a player’s tournament performance against three
different static opponents. Through the use of Monte Carlo
simulation on a slightly simplified form of no limit Texas
Hold’em we find that all four of these factors are statistically
significant in their contribution.
The strategies we find determine which hands should be
played dependent upon the additional game information. To
create a strategy using all the available information, however,
we cannot simply combine the suggested betting actions
from the single factor results. This is because the single
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factor strategies are often in conflict in any given situation.
Therefore the second hypothesis that we test is that an
evolutionary algorithm is able to resolve such disagreements,
and that the resulting strategy is stronger than any achieved
by employing only one of the factors in isolation. Results
contained within this work show this to be true.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Texas Hold’em
Texas Hold’em (also known simply as Hold’em) is the
most widely played poker variant. It is this form which is
used as the main event in the annual World Series of Poker. A
game of Texas Hold’em can be played with up to 22 players,
although it is more usual to see between two and ten players
at a single table. A comprehensive set of rules for the game
of Texas Hold’em is available online [1].
Texas Hold’em typically employs one of three different
forms of betting structure: limit, pot limit, or no limit. In
limit Hold’em, the size of the bets are fixed amounts. In the
first two betting rounds, each bet or raise is a set amount. In
the final two rounds the fixed bet size doubles. In pot limit
Hold’em a player may wager any amount up to the size of the
pot. No-limit Hold’em removes this restriction by allowing
each player to bet any amount up to their stack size.
As with all poker games, Hold’em can be played either as
a ring game (also known as cash game) or in a tournament.
In a ring game the players contest pots with real money
and no predetermined end time. A poker tournament, on
the other hand, is played with tournament chips and ends
once the game has been reduced to a single player. In a
ring game players may continually enter and exit the table,
and players who lose all their chips are able to purchase
more to continue in the game. By contrast, the players in
a tournament usually buy a set number of tournament chips
before the game and are eliminated from the competition if
their stack size reaches zero. The major differences between
ring game and tournament play are summarised in Table I.
TABLE I
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RING GAME AND TOURNAMENT
POKER
Difference Ring Game Tournament
Entry fee Variable Tournament cost
Chips Money replacement Game tokens
Blinds Fixed Rising schedule
Number of players Limited to a table Unlimited
Game exit Player discretion Zero chips
Profit and loss On each hand Based on finish
B. Previous Poker Research
The first academic investigations into the game of poker
were undertaken in the mid-twentieth century. Early pioneers
in the field of game theory, such as von Neumann and
Morgenstern [2], employed greatly simplified poker variants
to formulate a framework for strategy selection in non-
cooperative environments. The toy pokers that were exam-
ined were typically only two- or three-player games, and
used pared decks of cards to reduce the space of possible
strategies.
More recent investigations into poker have focused on
developing computer programs which are able to play more
realistic variants to a high standard. The most advanced
and successful work on computer poker play to date has
been produced by the Game-playing, Analytical methods,
Minimax search, and Empirical Studies (GAMES) Group at
the University of Alberta, led by Jonathan Schaeffer.
The GAMES Groups’ poker research started with the
development of programs designed to play ten-player limit
Texas Hold’em in a ring game, and employed a combination
of statistical measures and expert rules to effect decision-
making [3]. Billings et al. [4] then turned to two-player
limit Hold’em, for which they were able to derive “pseudo-
optimal” strategies. Recent efforts by the GAMES Group
target the addition of opponent modelling to the game
theoretic foundation, with greatly improved results [5].
Outside of academia, many books have been written on
strategy for play in Texas Hold’em. Whilst poker literature
for ring game play abounds, relatively little has been written
on Texas Hold’em tournament strategy. Those that exist
discuss the differences between ring game and tournament
play, and expound on how certain factors affect strategic
considerations.
The most common strategic messages in the non-academic
writings relate to how one’s range of playable starting hands
should increase throughout a tournament, the importance of
stack size in betting decisions, and how the payoff structure
of the tournament determines correct strategy. The purpose
of this research is to empirically validate some of these
assertions.
C. Evolutionary Algorithms Applied to Poker
Evolutionary algorithms have been commonly applied to
search for strong strategies in a wide variety of different
games. One notable example of this is the development of the
checkers player Blondie24 by Kumar Chellapilla and David
Fogel [6].
The first, and to date most extensive attempts to apply
evolutionary computation to poker have been performed by
Luigi Barone and Lyndon While [7], [8]. The authors develop
poker players that are able to adapt strategically given inputs
from their environment, such as their own hand strength,
seating position, bet size, and a measure of their opponents’
playing styles. The experiments performed in their research
use Texas Hold’em with limit betting, and are employed
within a ring game format.
Graham Kendall and Mark Willdig [9] employ evolu-
tionary methods to learn to play a simplified draw poker
game. Candidates from the population are played at tables
containing opponents of different styles, and the adaptive
players are seen to adjust their strategy appropriately to each
situation.
Texas Hold’em has also been used in research by Jason
Noble [10]. Rather than play against static opposition, his
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work seeks to develop strong poker players through self-
play. However, the primary focus of these studies is on the
comparison of different co-evolutionary methods, and poker
is simply used as the test bed for the experiments.
The programs developed by the GAMES Group have been
shown to perform well against professional poker players,
but no such achievements were reported in the work on
evolutionary poker programs. Whilst it presently seems that
the approach of marrying game theoretic understanding with
opponent modelling has the greatest promise in achieving the
strongest poker programs, results from evolutionary methods
have highlighted some of the strategic problems faced in
playing poker games.
III. SPECIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
All the experiments performed focus on ten-player winner-
takes-all all in or fold pre-flop Texas Hold’em. This format
makes one simplification to an authentic poker tournament.
The restriction of the players’ betting actions to all in or fold
reduces the strategy space to a tractable size. Substituting the
more flexible betting choice with a binary decision shifts the
focus to the more general and important strategic question
of when to bet, rather than how much. Since players will
have either bet all of their chips or folded before the flop,
the resulting betting rounds are redundant. All in or fold
pre-flop betting strategies have been proposed for use in real
tournaments, and we use three of these taken from the poker
literature as the opponents within our experiments.
Whilst it is more usual for ten-player tournaments to
employ a percentage payout structure, the “shootout” format
with a single winner can also be employed. The winner-takes-
all design only credits a player for finishing first, and hence
second place is equivalent to finishing last. Establishing
the competitions in this way ensures that we assess each
strategy’s ability to win tournaments, and not just their
capacity for tournament survival.
All players start with $1,000 in tournament chips. The
tournaments use eleven levels, with the blinds increasing as
the tournament progresses. Each level consists of ten hands,
except for the final level which is used until the tournament
concludes.
There were a total of three different opponents used
across all the simulations. These encoded the Sklansky Basic
strategy, Sklansky’s Improved strategy, and the Kill Phil
Rookie strategy, and are explained below.
The first two strategies are taken from the book “Tourna-
ment Poker for Advanced Players” [11]. The Sklansky Basic
strategy is highly restrictive, and will only bet the very best
starting hands once another player has already bet into the
pot. If no other player has yet bet, this strategy will move
all in with a slightly larger subset of hands. The Sklansky
Improved strategy is similarly restrained in the hands it will
play if an opponent has entered the pot. Where this strategy
differs from the first is in its use of the ratio of the player’s
stack to the total amount of the blinds to determine playable
hands when no other player has yet made a bet.
The third opponent employed is based on one from the
book “Kill Phil” [12]. This book contains several strategies
of increasing complexity, and these experiments use the
simplest, so-called “Rookie”, strategy. Similar to the two
Sklansky strategies, the Kill Phil Rookie strategy contains
instructions on which hands are playable depending upon
whether or not an opponent has yet bet into the pot. The
major difference in this strategy is that the classification
of playable hands is determined by the number of players
remaining and the tournament level.
For all the experiments, we seat our test player at a
table against nine similar opponents from either of the three
mentioned above.
Note that we do not incorporate any opponent modelling
within these experiments. Whilst we acknowledge that this is
an essential element of strong poker strategy in any setting,
here we seek more general results regarding the dynamics of
tournament play.
By discriminating between “suited” and “offsuit” hands
there are 169 different starting hands in Texas Hold’em.
Using the hand strength ordering of Sklansky and
Chubukov [13], we create thirteen groups of thirteen hands:
the strongest in Group 1 down to the weakest in Group 13.
Note that the classes are not all of precisely the same size
due to the varying frequencies of pairs, suited, and unsuited
hands. Whilst the classification employed here is extremely
coarse, it is sufficient to show the dynamics of tournament
strategy that we seek.
The first suite of experiments use Monte Carlo simulation
to assess strategies which employ either hand strength knowl-
edge alone, or this in conjunction with another factor believed
to influence decision-making. All strategies take the form of
a threshold value between zero and thirteen. In measuring
the performance of players using hand strength knowledge
alone, a strategy (x) represents a player who will move all in
with cards in the groups higher than or equal to x, and fold
otherwise. When we incorporate one extra game factor the
representation becomes two-dimensional, (x, y). The x-value
is used if the binary variable is true, and the y-value is used
if the binary variable is false. The binary variables used are
summarised in Table II.
TABLE II
BINARY VARIABLES USED TO ASSESS DECISION FACTORS
Factor Binary Variable
Opponents’ actions No prior bet in the current hand
Tournament stage Tournament level ≤ 6
Chip stack amount M ≤ 5
Seating position Early position
The variable M used to assess chip stack size is taken from
Harrington [14] and is simply the ratio of one’s stack to the
total of the blinds at the current level. Early and late position
are determined relative to the dealer, such that a player in
the first half of those required to act is deemed to be in early
position.
The simulations sequentially test every possible strategy
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over a series of 200 tournaments. A player scores one point
for winning a tournament, and zero otherwise.
To extend the aforementioned representation into multi-
ple dimensions for each possible binary variable presents
problems due to the computational time required to cover
all of the strategies. Instead, we employ an evolutionary
algorithm which is able to encode an action for any possible
combination of the four factors.
A strategy within the evolutionary algorithm is encoded
as a chromosome of sixteen real numbers, each value taken
from the interval [0, 14). A single gene determines the hands
played in one of the 24 scenario combinations of the four
binary variables. When required to act the evolutionary
player refers to the relevant gene, and moves all in if the
floor of the value is less than or equal to the group containing
their hand.
The evolutions each commence with a population of
twenty randomly generated strategies. This comparatively
small population was found to be sufficient in producing
significant results. Individuals within the population repro-
duce according to tournament selection, with two elites pass-
ing through to the next generation unaltered. Reproduction
occurs at a rate of 70%, and employs uniform crossover
with equal weighting between the parents. Mutation applies a
Gaussian shock to a randomly selected allele with a standard
deviation of 2, and reflection occurs at the upper and lower
bounds. Many of these shocks do not result in a change in
an individual’s strategy due to the representation used. In
these experiments we use a relatively high mutation rate of
20%, although smaller values were found to produce similar
results.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Monte Carlo Simulation Results
Results from the first set of experiments, in which the test
players act according to hand strength alone, are plotted in
Figure 1.
The graph clearly shows that betting with either too many
hand groups or too few results in reduced performance.
Against all three opposing strategies the highest number of
tournament wins arise when the player moves all in with
around the top four groups of starting hands.
There is, unfortunately, a large amount of noise seen in
this plot. This can be reduced by simulating each strategy
over a larger number of tournaments than the 200 used here.
Further simulations were performed with the players each
playing 1,000 tournaments, and more clearly defined peaks
were observed. We present the results over 200 tournaments
for comparison with those from the inclusion of the binary
variables which follow. In these latter cases, simulating all
196 (x, y) strategy pairs over 1,000 tournaments would be
extremely time-consuming.
The next suite of experiments expands the strategy repre-
sentation from one to two threshold values. Each value cor-
responds to playable hand groups depending on the state of
the additional binary variable. Here again each possible (x, y)
strategy, (x, y ∈ {0, 1, ..., 13}) is played in 200 tournaments
against a table of each of the three adversarial strategies.
Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the results achieved against
the Sklansky Basic strategy. Plots showing scores against
the Sklansky Improved and Kill Phil Rookie strategies can
be found at the authors’ website [15], and all show similar
surfaces.
There are two interesting aspects to these graphs. Firstly,
all are asymmetric in the line y = x. This shows that
the information contained within the binary variable is of
consequence to tournament performance. For comparison
purposes a control experiment was performed in which the
binary variable was chosen to be the result of a coin toss.
The plot of this experiment in Figure 6 shows much greater
symmetry, subject to noise.
The second important aspect of these results concerns the
number of tournaments won by incorporating the additional
information. The peaks of those graphs representing the
inclusion of prior bet knowledge, tournament level, chip stack
size, and seating position are far larger than that achieved
through hand strength knowledge alone. The peak from the
control experiment utilising a coin toss is comparable to hand
strength only, as expected.
The strategies leading to the best results against the
Sklansky Basic (SB), Sklansky Improved (SI), and Kill Phil
Rookie (KPR) strategies are summarised in Table III.
TABLE III
BEST STRATEGIES FOUND BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS AGAINST
VARIOUS OPPONENTS
Game Knowledge SB SI KPR
Hand strength only (4) (3) & (5) (4)
Hand and prior bet (9, 0) (13, 3) (12, 3)
Hand and level (1, 12) (1, 11) (3, 12)
Hand and stack (5, 0) (12, 2) (8, 2)
Hand and position (8, 2) (13, 2) (11, 1)
It is evident from these results that the state of a binary
variable polarises the test player’s best strategy in all cases
against all opponents. The nature of these strategies also bear
favourable comparison to suggested tournament play in the
non-academic poker literature.
If no opponent has yet bet the best strategy is to play many
hands. If the pot has already been opened, however, a lesser
number of hands should be played. Poker authors state that
a player should be much tighter if an opponent has already
bet into the pot.
Knowledge of tournament level affects the best play by
being tighter in the early levels and looser in the late ones.
These strategies also follow poker author’s recommendations.
They state that at the start of a tournament one should be
more concerned about being eliminated and so should play
to protect chips. Then in the later levels one should play
more hands to try to steal the increased blinds.
A player with a small number of chips is seen to move
all in with more hand groups than one with a relatively large
stack. The escalating blinds used in tournaments mean that
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Fig. 1. Tournament wins against various opponents using hand strength
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012345678910111213
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
0
50
100
150
Groups Played: Prior BetGroups Played: No Prior Bet
To
ur
na
m
en
t W
in
s 
/ 2
00
Fig. 2. Tournament wins against Sklansky Basic opponents for strategies
incorporating opponents’ prior bet knowledge
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Fig. 3. Tournament wins against Sklansky Basic opponents for strategies
incorporating tournament level knowledge
012345678910111213
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
0
20
40
60
80
Groups Played: M > 5Groups Played: M <= 5
To
ur
na
m
en
t W
in
s 
/ 2
00
Fig. 4. Tournament wins against Sklansky Basic opponents for strategies
incorporating chip stack knowledge
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Fig. 5. Tournament wins against Sklansky Basic opponents for strategies
incorporating seating position knowledge
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Fig. 6. Tournament wins against Sklansky Basic opponents for strategies
incorporating coin toss knowledge (control experiment)
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persistently waiting for strong hands leads a player to being
anted away. Again the best strategies found here conform to
the suggested style.
The only results here that are in conflict with poker
authors concern those from the inclusion of seating position
knowledge. Here we see that a player in early position bets
more hands than one in a later seat. It is more commonly
suggested that correct strategy is the opposite of this. A late
seat means that there are less players to act after oneself, and
so specifically in an unopened pot a bet with a slightly worse
hand than normal can prove to be profitable. The reason for
the disagreement in our experiments is likely to be two-fold.
Firstly, all the opposing strategies play a more restricted
set of hands once a player has entered the pot. When our
test player is in early position it seems to be able to take
advantage of this by betting weaker hands and essentially
“scaring” the opposition. The second likely cause is that we
are not able to distinguish between those occasions where the
test player is first into a pot. It could still be the case that in
these scenarios our player is playing more aggressively.
It is this desire to see all factors in combination that leads
to the next set of experiments. The results previously seen in
Table III contain potential conflicts for a strategy seeking to
incorporate all game-related factors. For example, suppose
we are playing the Sklansky Basic opponents and are in the
latter half of a tournament with a large stack size. The best
strategies found would suggest playing any hand in the top
twelve groups due to the tournament level, but contradictorily
that we should fold all hands since we have a large stack.
The simulation-based approach is expedient in the case of
only one decision factor, but as we include more the time
taken to cover the strategy space grows exponentially. For
this reason we turn towards an evolutionary approach.
B. Evolutionary Algorithm Results
Candidates within a population encode strategies that
dictate which hand groups to play in any of the 16 pos-
sible scenarios within the strategy hypercube. The guided
stochastic search then moves the population in the direction
of stronger solutions.
A randomly seeded population of twenty candidate solu-
tions were each played in 200 tournaments per generation
against tables consisting of each of the three opponents. The
average population fitness per generation, and the incremen-
tal global best solutions are shown for the evolutions against
Sklansky Basic, Sklansky Improved, and Kill Phil Rookie
opposition in Figures 7, 8, and 9 respectively.
All of these plots show that the average population fit-
nesses are quick to increase in the first ten generations
of the evolution. Strong solutions are more likely to be
maintained, whilst weaker strategies fail to reproduce. In the
early generations the rate of finding new global best strategies
is at its fastest. These results are in keeping with generally
observed trends in the use of evolutionary algorithms.
Improvement in the global best solution against Sklansky
Basic opponents noticeably levels off by generation 25. The
evolutions against the other two opponents were still finding
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new global bests approximately every five generations when
the runs were terminated. It is expected that even stronger
strategies would have been uncovered had the number of
generations been increased.
The most remarkable aspect of these graphs is in observ-
ing the number of tournament wins achieved by the best
found strategies. At the termination of the run, the best
solution against Sklansky Basic had won 178 out of 200
tournaments, a rate of almost 90%. This figure is a marked
improvement on the comparable 38 tournament wins gained
using hand strength alone shown previously in Figure 1. The
evolutions against Sklansky Improved and Kill Phil Rookie
opposition also show marked improvements, with both more
than tripling the top score found based only on hand strength.
Next, we took all the best strategies found using the
different representations and played them off against their
respective opponents over 5,000 further tournaments. Per-
forming these experiments over a larger number of tourna-
ments allows us to gain a greater level of statistical surety in
the scores attained. The number of tournament wins in these
enlarged experiments are shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
TOURNAMENT WINS (OUT OF 5,000) OF BEST FOUND STRATEGIES
AGAINST VARIOUS OPPONENTS
Game Knowledge SB SI KPR
Hand strength only 1,004 565 319
Hand and prior bet 3,562 1,095 595
Hand and level 1,997 746 574
Hand and stack 1,637 819 534
Hand and position 1,417 715 460
Hand and all factors 4,340 1,165 786
For all three opponents the knowledge of whether or not
another player has bet into the pot shows the largest gains.
Intuitively, we would expect knowledge of one’s opponents
actions to be the most important factor since all players are
in competition with one another for the money in the pot.
Least improvement comes from seating position knowledge.
The lesser importance of this is most probably due to the
all in or fold nature of the tournaments. Poker authors have
stated the much of the positional advantage is reduced by
such strategies.
Statistical analysis was performed on these results using
the Z-test for the equality of two proportions. Firstly, we
tested the null hypothesis that the proportion of tournaments
won by the strategies incorporating a single binary variable
was the same as those using hand strength alone against
each respective opponent. All were found to be rejected as is
shown in Table V. From this we conclude that the inclusion
of any of these extra pieces of game information significantly
improves tournament performance.
Following this we tested the null hypothesis that the
strategies found by the evolutionary algorithms won the same
proportion of tournaments as those achieved in the best case
of hand strength and one other factor (in each case this
factor is knowledge of an opponent’s prior bet). Table VI
reveals that all null hypotheses were rejected at the 95%
TABLE V
P-VALUES FOR THE PROPORTION OF TOURNAMENTS WON WITH THE
INCLUSION OF A GAME FACTOR COMPARED TO HAND STRENGTH ALONE
Factor SB SI KPR
Prior bet < 0.00001 < 0.00001 < 0.00001
Level < 0.00001 < 0.00001 < 0.00001
Stack < 0.00001 < 0.00001 < 0.00001
Position < 0.00001 < 0.00001 < 0.00001
confidence level. Hence we conclude that the incorporation
of knowledge from all four factors has produced strategies
with a markedly higher win rate compared to those utilising
only a single factor.
TABLE VI
P-VALUES FOR THE PROPORTION OF TOURNAMENTS WON WITH THE
INCLUSION OF ALL GAME FACTORS COMPARED TO HAND STRENGTH
AND PRIOR BET KNOWLEDGE
SB SI KPR
Evolved player < 0.00001 < 0.05 < 0.00001
It should be remembered that the opposition strategies are
able to act on exact knowledge of their hand, stack size, and
tournament level. Our test players are severely limited in the
granularity of the information they can base decisions on due
to the coarse classifications employed. The results given are
perhaps even more impressive in the light of this.
To analyse the nature of the best evolutionary strategies
found we calculated the average hand group played for each
possible state of the four binary variables. These values are
presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE ALLELE VALUES IN GLOBAL BEST STRATEGIES AGAINST EACH
OPPONENT
Scenario SB SI KPR
No prior bet 8.5 7.6 8.4
Prior bet 2.1 5.9 5.0
Level ≤ 6 4.5 5.0 5.0
Level > 6 6.1 8.5 8.4
M ≤ 5 6.9 6.8 8.0
M > 5 3.8 6.8 5.4
Early position 6.6 8.6 8.0
Late position 4.0 4.9 5.4
An inspection of these results shows the same trends as
those previously found in Table III. The strategies typically
play less hands in the following situations: after an opponent
has bet, in the early levels of a tournament, with a large stack
size, and in late position.
It is interesting to note that these best strategies have
managed to resolve conflicts in the signals given by each
separate game factor. The strategies found by the evolution-
ary algorithm manage to implicitly weigh the importance of
each piece of information in formulating a betting action
depending upon the situation.
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V. FURTHER WORK
The framework used in the evolutionary experiments is
extremely amenable to expansion. For example, any other
factor thought to influence decision-making could be readily
incorporated into the representation.
One possible enhancement would be to increase the reso-
lution on the factors already employed. An enlarged number
of classifications of stack size, tournament level, and seating
position would further refine the strategy space.
The hand groupings used in these experiments are too
coarse to be of direct benefit in a real poker game. Split-
ting out the upper groups into better defined classes, and
condensing the bad hands into a smaller number of larger
groups would better reflect the differences in starting hand
potential.
An interesting topic for future investigation is to better
understand the relative importance of each factor dependent
upon tournament level. For example, some poker authors
state that stack size becomes more important than hand
strength towards the end of a tournament.
Clearly the most important continuation of this research is
the removal of the all in or fold betting restriction. As well
as being able to bet fractional amounts of one’s stack, the
strategies called for would also have to encode for post-flop
play. It remains an open question whether an unrestricted
Texas Hold’em tournament strategy could be found within
such a framework.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this research we set out to show that information
available to players related to their opponents’ prior actions,
the stage of the tournament, chip stack size, and seating
position are all important elements in the strategy of a Texas
Hold’em tournament player. By comparing the performance
of players who use knowledge of their hand strength alone
to those who incorporate each of the above factors we have
shown that there is a statistically significant improvement in
the number of tournaments won by the latter.
We then demonstrated that an evolutionary algorithm is
able to resolve conflicting signals from the decision-making
factors. The strategies which combine all the available
information are seen to perform to a statistically higher
standard than those which use only one piece of knowledge
in conjunction with their hand strength.
The “strategies” we have derived in this research should
perhaps technically be termed “counter-strategies”, since
each is specific to their own particular opponent. However,
the interpretations of the counter-strategies found (i.e. play
more hands if no opponent has bet, if one has a small
stack, late in the tournament etc.) are the same against all
three opponents of increasing complexity. It is compelling to
suggest that these tactics, which mirror the guidance given
in the non-academic poker literature, should underpin the
strategy of a competent player against any given opponent(s).
Whilst we cannot go as far as to claim this outright, our
results do lend weight to that argument.
At present the approach of game theoretic understanding
and opponent modelling has been seen to yield stronger
poker programs than any that have been found by evolu-
tionary algorithms alone. However, transitioning these limit
ring game strategies to a no limit tournament setting requires
additional understanding of the complexities of tournament
play. The results presented in this research show that an
evolutionary approach is well suited to the task of analysing
tournament strategy, and that it can be used to complement
other forms of computer poker research.
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